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1. Introduction 
The RFID tag is equipped with a small IC tip and antenna, and data can be read from or 
written to it via radio signal. This device has attracted much attention because it is extremely 
effective for promoting work efficiency in supply chains and for building IT-based systems 
connecting companies and/or industries. The scope of RFID use is spreading throughout 
the entire product life cycle, and RFID is now used not only for primary distribution from 
production to sale, but also for secondary forms of distribution, such as recycling or 
maintenance. 
The difference between the scope of primary distribution only and the scope of a product’s 
entire life cycle is that in the latter a greater number of general companies and people are 
involved in the distribution process. Therefore, a provision for protecting data written to 
RFID tag memory must be included when RFID systems are built so that data cannot be 
illegally read or overwritten. 
In addition, a solution to RFID privacy problems is required so that items with RFID tags 
can be safely provided to many consumers (CASPIAN et al., 2003; Albrecht & Mcintyre, 
2005). We define the privacy problem as unauthorized persons abusing the radio-
communications function of RFID tags, and we consider two kinds of privacy problem: 
a. Possession Privacy Problem: This is the problem of unauthorized persons or agents 
being able to surreptitiously detect items that other persons are carrying because of the 
item codes recorded in the memory of IC tags. 
b. Location Privacy Problem: This is the problem of an unauthorized persons or agents 
knowing where a person is without that person’s knowledge because a unique ID is 
recorded in an IC tag memory. 
A guideline for solving privacy problems (GS1 EPCglobal, 2005) states that RFID tags 
should be removed from products before the products are provided to consumers. 
However, the requirements for consumers, who want to protect their privacy, conflict with 
those of industries that want to use RFID tags throughout the entire life cycle of products –
satisfying both requirements is very difficult. 
To protect consumer privacy, some researchers have proposed systems that mount a hash 
function in the RFID tag which authenticates interrogators (Weis, 2003; Juels.& Pappu, 2003; 
Source: Radio Frequency Identification Fundamentals and Applications, Bringing Research to Practice, Book edited by: Cristina Turcu,  
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Engberg et al., 2004). However, a hash function has too many gates to satisfy user 
preferences regarding the size of RFID chips, the communication distance, and the need for 
an anti-collision algorithm (Satoh & Inoue, 2007). Therefore, mounting hash functions in 
RFID tags is too difficult at present. We think mounting a function that authenticates the 
interrogator by using a password is more realistic. 
The password authentication function mounted in RFID is standardized by international 
standards specification ISO/IEC 18000-6 Type C. RFID tags that included a read lock 
function for privacy protection based on ISO/IEC 18000-6 Type C were developed in the 
Secure RFID Project (Honzawa, 2008) established by the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and 
Industry in 2006. To read data in the memory of such RFIDs, authentication of a RFID 
password requires this read lock function as well as a write lock function. Both these 
functions prevent illegal reading and writing of the data in RFID memory. However, the 
security of all RFID tags is compromised when one RFID password is stolen if all the RFID 
passwords are identical. To reduce the severity of this problem requires setting up a 
different RFID password for every group of RFID tags. 
In this paper, we propose a system for using RFID tags that includes an interrogator with an 
algorithm that generates RFID passwords. This system sets up the grouping of RFID 
passwords for RFID tags that are used in the secondary distribution stage, and protects both 
the RFID data and consumer privacy. 
2. Problem with RFID password management for RFID system 
RFID passwords must be managed rigorously to prevent attacks that illegally rewrite data 
or threaten consumer privacy when data is stored in the memory of RFID tags conforming 
to the Secure RFID Project specification based on ISO/IEC 18000-6 Type C. If all RFID 
passwords set in RFID tags are identical throughout an industry, theft of one RFID 
password will compromise all RFID tags. 
To solve this problem, we considered a system that sets up a different RFID password for 
each group of RFID tags. Although this system does not improve the security of individual 
RFIDs tags, it narrows the extent of the risk to the whole system. For example, consider the 
case in which an RFID tag is illegally accessed and its password is stolen. As Fig. 1(a) shows, 
if the same RFID password, X, has been set to all RFID tags, anyone with the stolen 
password will be able to access all the RFID tags by using the stolen RFID password X. 
However, as Fig. 1(b) shows, when a different RFID password is assigned for each group of 
RFID tags, even if an unauthorized user has stolen the RFID password they can access only 
one group of RFID tags; the other groups of RFID tags remain safe. Therefore, as few RFID 
tags have the same RFID password, the damage from a stolen RFID password is contained. 
When setting up a different RFID password for every group of RFID tags, though, one has 
to be careful regarding this privacy protection. For an authorized interrogator to access 
RFID tags, it must be able to manage the relation between an RFID tag and a RFID 
password. The identifier of an RFID tag must not be used for invading privacy even though 
an RFID tag must be discriminable for interrogators to manage the relation between the tags 
and an RFID password. Therefore, an RFID system used throughout the entire life cycle of a 
product should satisfy the following requirements: 
a. The system must manage the relation between an RFID tag and the grouping RFID 
password of the RFID tag, and be able to generate a grouping RFID password for the 
RFID tag immediately after inventorying it. 
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b. The system must use as little item information as possible for the identifier of RFID tags 
to protect possession privacy. 
c. The system must avoid using unique IDs for the identifier of RFID tags, as much as 
possible, to protect location privacy. 
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Fig. 1. Systems in which interrogators access RFID tags by using RFID passwords 
3. An RFID system that generates group RFID passwords 
3.1 Group RFID password generation method 
An RFID system that generates group RFID passwords only allows authorized interrogators 
to access RFID tags, and allows those interrogators to read or write data in the RFID 
memory. Each RFID tag receives an RFID password from an interrogator and authenticates 
the interrogator; i.e., judges whether the interrogator is authorized for access. 
This system sets data called “PASS KEY” for generating a different RFID password for every 
group of tags, and sets the RFID password as an RFID tag. A group RFID password 
generation algorithm that finds the right RFID password for each group of RFID tags and 
sends it to the RFID tag is mounted in an authorized interrogator. The parameters of the 
grouping RFID password generation algorithm are a master key and a PASS KEY written in 
an RFID tag. 
Figure 2 is a flow chart of the procedure for generating and managing the group RFID 
passwords. 
In the preparation stage, a user chooses a random number as the PASS KEY. The group 
RFID password generation algorithm calculates this PASS KEY by using a function with 
collision resistance and pre-image resistance; i.e., a hash function with a master key. The 
calculation result that this algorithm outputs is used as the group RFID password. The 
system sends and sets selected PASS KEYs and the generated group RFID passwords to 
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RFID tags. Since a different PASS KEY is chosen for each group of RFID tags, the RFID 
password is also set as a different value for each group of RFID tags. 
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Fig. 2. Procedure for generating group RFID passwords 
Whenever a user accesses an RFID tag, the user’s interrogator first demands the RFID PASS 
KEY. The RFID tag receives this demand and reports the PASS KEY to the interrogator. The 
interrogator first calculates the PASS KEY that it receives from the RFID tag by using a 
master key and a hash function, and then generates a group RFID password. The 
interrogator then sends the generated group RFID password to the RFID tag. The RFID tag 
compares the received group RFID password to the group RFID password that was 
programmed into it in the preparation stage. If the two RFID passwords are the same, the 
RFID tag will change to the secured state. When the RFID tag changes to the secured state, 
the user can read or write to the data in the RFID memory. 
Authorized users are not the only ones who can get the PASS KEY from this RFID tag; 
unauthorized people or agents can also get it. However, since those without authorization 
do not know the master key, they cannot generate the group RFID password from the PASS 
KEY, and they cannot read or write to data in the RFID tag. 
Generating group RFID passwords requires that the procedure to generate two RFID 
passwords with the same value from two different PASS KEYs must be made difficult, and 
decoding a master key from a RFID password and a PASS KEY must also be difficult. 
Therefore, we adopt a hash function equipped with collision resistance and pre-image 
resistance as our group RFID password generation algorithm. To construct an RFID system 
with higher security, an effective method is to use a hash function that has been previously 
evaluated by the public, such as SHA-1, and to store the master key in a tamper-resistant 
device. 
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3.2 Structure of an RFID system with a group RFID password generation method 
Here, we provide an example of the structure of an RFID system that uses a group RFID 
password generation method that sets up and manages group RFID passwords in RFID 
tags. Figure 3 presents the structure of this system. This system uses RFID tags conforming 
to the Secure RFID Project specification based on ISO/IEC 18000-6 Type C. The tags are 
mounted with rewritable memory and an authentication function. The system also includes 
interrogators, conforming to the Secure RFID Project specification, that communicate with 
the RFID tags and a tamper-resistant device that restricts users and generates group RFID 
passwords. The system has middleware that controls the interrogators, the tamper-resistant 
device, and an RFID application. The middleware and the application can be installed in a 
terminal. The tamper-resistant device has a user authentication function to prevent 
unauthorized use of this system and a grouping RFID password generation algorithm that 
minimizes the damage when RFID passwords are disclosed to unauthorized users. 
The user authentication function in the tamper-resistant device applies PIN authentication 
technology. Users can only use an interrogator after they input an authentic PIN. If they fail 
to do so, they cannot use an interrogator and cannot access RFID tags. This PIN 
authentication function can prevent unauthorized use of the interrogator, even if the 
interrogator is stolen. 
The group RFID password generation algorithm is also mounted in the tamper-resistant 
device, and is processed within this device to prevent leaks and misappropriation of the 
group RFID password generation algorithm. 
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Fig. 3. Structure of system for group RFID password generation 
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4. Solutions to privacy problems 
To protect possession privacy, PASS KEY data should not include any data that identifies 
items; e.g., an item code or a product number. PASS KEY data should be meaningless data 
such as a random number. If the PASS KEY is unique and anyone can read it, location 
privacy is at risk. Moreover, if the PASS KEY of many RFID tags is set up to be identical, 
many tags will be affected if one RFID password is leaked since the RFID password for 
every group of RFID tags is also identical. Therefore, some PASS KEYs should be set up as 
identical to reduce the risk of privacy invasion, and some PASS KEYs must be distributed so 
that the effects of RFID password disclosure will be limited. We estimated the number of 
equivalent PASS KEYs that satisfies these two demands by the following methods. 
When a PASS KEY is read, the probability of those who are carrying the RFID tag to be 
specified by that PASS KEY can be calculated as the number of those who can be found out 
of the entire group carrying an RFID tag that stores identical PASS KEYs. We call this 
probability the specific probability R. 
When we define the number of the tags with the same PASS KEY as the equivalent number 
M, the specific probability of privacy invasion R can be explained as a reciprocal of the 
equivalent number M. 
 MR 1=  (1) 
On the other hand, the influence level of RFID password disclosure, E, when an RFID 
password is leaked is calculated as the number N of the RFID tags in the market and the 
equivalent number M, which is the number of tags with the same RFID password. 
 NME =  (2) 
Risk, F, is defined as the sum of the weight of the specific probability R and the influence 
level E. To improve the balance of both specific probability R and the influence level E, we 
calculate the equivalent number M that provides the lowest risk F. Here, the weight is 
expressed as w. 
 NMwMwERF +=+= 1  (3) 
 NwM 1min
−=  (4) 
The weight w corresponds to the probability that an RFID password will be leaked. 
Figure 4 shows the relations between the probability of privacy invasion R, the influence level 
of RFID password disclosure E and the risk F. In this figure, we show that if specific 
probability R is set too low, the risk F become high because the influence level E becomes high. 
In the following section, we find the effective equivalent number Mmin in the case of a 
shopping mall where RFID tags are used. 
5. Evaluation of the proposal method’s applicability 
5.1 Trail analyzing simulation for invasion of location privacy 
In this section, we simulate the probability of someone being able to invade a consumer's 
location privacy in a shopping mall. We assume that consumers carrying items with RFID 
tags move about in a shopping mall, and unauthorized people or agents secretly install 
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Fig. 4. Balance of both specific probability R and the influence level E 
interrogators and trail consumers by reading the RFID tags. We measure the traceable 
distance for some equivalent number M, and find the equivalent number Mmin at which the 
traceable distance becomes the shortest in the case of a shopping mall. 
a. Modelling the shopping mall 
We assume four models about the shape of a shopping mall as shown in Table 1 and Fig. 5. 
The floor space of all models is 40,000 m2. There is an entrance in the centre of each 
neighbourhood of the first floor of the shopping mall. In each model, the shopping mall 
contains 100 stores. Each store’s floor space is 225 m2 and one interrogator is installed in 
each store. The width of all passages in each model is 10 m. Each shopping mall always 
contains 2,000 consumers. A PASS KEY value of an RFID is recorded along with the position 
and the time when a consumer comes within the readable range of an interrogator, which is 
2 m. Model 1 is a 200 x 200 m square within which consumers can move freely because there 
are no walls dividing stores. Model 2 is a 200 x 200 m square within which consumers move 
through passages because there are walls separating the stores. Model 3 is a frame type 
building, around a central courtyard, with a 1,160 m outside perimeter and an 840 m inside 
perimeter; there is a single passage with stores on both sides. Model 4 is a building with four 
50 x 50 m floors where consumers move between floors using a central escalator or one of 
four elevators. 
 
Model # Space Floors Walls Entrances Interrogators Visitors 
1 40,000 m2 1 No 4 sides of 1F 100 2,000 
2 40,000 m2 1 Set 4 sides of 1F 100 2,000 
3 40,000 m2 1 Set 4 sides of 1F 100 2,000 
4 40,000 m2 4 Set 4 sides of 1F 100 2,000 
Table 1. Model parameters 
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Fig. 5. Types of shopping mall 
The consumer movement pattern in this simulation is as follows: 
• Each consumer's starting point is randomly chosen from among four entrances. 
• The stores to which each consumer goes are chosen at random. 
• The number of stores to which each consumer goes varies randomly from 3 to 7. 
• A consumer begins by moving to the nearest selected store from the chosen starting 
point. 
• If a consumer arrives at a store, he will stay once and then will move to the nearest 
selected store from there. 
• If a consumer arrives at the last selected store, he will then return to the starting point. 
• The time a consumer spends at a store varies randomly from 10 minutes to 30 minutes. 
• The distance which a consumer moves in each step is 5 m. 
• The speed at which a consumer moves is 1 m/s. 
b. Trail analyzing  system 
This system collects and analyzes log data on the detection of RFID tags with the installed 
interrogators for consumer trail analysis. The log data consists of an interrogator's ID, the 
installation position of the interrogator (x, y), a step number, and a PASS KEY value of an 
RFID. This system creates a consumer's trail by extracting arbitrary PASS KEY values in 
connection with the consumer out of log data, and sorting these data by time. In this system, 
there may be some RFID tags with the same PASS KEY values. To trail a consumer as fully 
as possible, the system disregards data detected at any point at which a consumer cannot 
physically arrive. 
5.2 Result of the trail analyzing simulation 
Figure 6 shows a simulation result for the case of five consumers who possess RFID tags 
with the same PASS KEY value in model 1. This figure shows the route consumer An 
actually followed and the route for the same consumer observed by the trail analysis system. 
The routes of the other consumers are also shown. Each white circle indicates an 
interrogator. In this case, consumer A started from point (110, 10). After moving 135 m, he 
encountered consumer C at point (90, 130). Therefore, the traceable distance was 135 m since 
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it became impossible for the trail analyzing system to distinguish consumer A and consumer 
B after their routes met. 
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Fig. 6. Flow line analysis simulation result 
Figure 7 shows histograms of the traceable distance L acquired through 10,000 simulations 
when the equivalent number M of PASS KEY was 1, 5, 10 or 20 and the shopping mall type 
was Model 1. The respective standard deviation was 148, 104, 55, and 27. This figure shows 
the traceable distance L becomes short if the equivalent number M increases. 
Figure 8 shows the average of the traceable distance L as a function of the equivalent 
number M in each of the four models. When the equivalent number M was 1, the traceable 
distance L was 817 m; when the equivalent number M was 70, the traceable distance L was 
0.9 m. In this simulation there were many consumers possessing RFID tags with the same 
PASS KEY value, so we know there was a high probability that consumers possessing RFID 
tags with the same PASS KEY value would meet and these consumers would consequently 
be hard to trail. 
Next, we consider the effect of RFID password disclosure E in this simulation. The influence 
rate wE when an RFID password is leaked is expressed as follows from equation (2). The 
probability w of an RFID password being decoded by brute force attack in one year and 
subsequently leaked is set to 50%. The number N of the RFID tags in the shopping mall is set 
to 2,000. 
 MwE
2000
5.0=  (5) 
The risk F obtained from this simulation result and equation (5) is shown in Fig. 8. (The right 
vertical axis in the figure shows the rate of risk F). This figure shows that an equivalent 
number M of about 45 leads to the smallest risk F. When the equivalent number M is 45, the 
influence level of RFID password disclosure E is about 2% and the traceable distance L is 
about 3.5 m although the distance which a consumer walked in a shopping mall is 817 m. 
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Fig. 7. Traceable distance L in case M = 1, 5, 10 and 20 
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Fig. 8. Traceable distance L vs. the equivalent number M 
6. Conclusion 
RFID privacy problems will have to be solved before items with RFID tags can be safely 
provided to consumers on a large scale. Here, we considered the location privacy problem 
of unauthorized persons or agents being able to trail a person by tracing a unique ID 
recorded in an attached RFID tag. 
We proposed a method for using RFID tags that include an interrogator with an algorithm 
to generate RFID passwords. This method groups RFID passwords for RFID tags in a way 
that protects consumer privacy. 
 We simulated the possibility of trailing a consumer in a shopping mall. We investigated 
how much the traceability of a consumer changed when the proposed method was applied. 
Simulation results showed that the traceability fell by about 0.4% when the influence level of 
RFID password leakage was 2% in this model. 
In practice, it may be difficult to read a consumer’s RFID tag from distances like those 
assumed in this simulation because RFID is easily influenced by various environmental 
conditions. However, even if invasion of privacy is technically difficult, consumers will 
remain concerned as long as there is any possibility of invasion of privacy through RFID. 
Therefore, our proposed method will be useful for RFID system application. 
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